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Case No. 20150317-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff!Appellee,

v.
TIMOTHY NOBLE WALKER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a third
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant

punched

his

wife

and

then

unconsciousness in a violent domestic dispute.
aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury.

strangled

her

to

He was charged with
The trial court also

instructed jurors on two lesser-included offenses: aggravated assault likely
to cause serious bodily injury, and assault. The jury convicted Defendant of
the first lesser-included offense, aggravated assault likely to cause serious
bodily injury.

The only question on appeal is whether the trial court's strangulation
instruction-"strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes
serious bodily injury" -comported with Utah law.

It did.

The Utah

Supreme Court has long held that strangulation to unconsciousness
constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law. Thus, the trial court's
strangulation instruction was a correct statement of law that this Court is
bound to uphold.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court properly instruct the jury that strangulation to
unconsciousness is serious bodily injury?

Standard of Review. Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness.
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, if 14, 29 P.3d 638.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2015) (aggravated
assault);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (West 2015) (serious bodily
injury).
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G

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of facts. 1
Defendant

punched

his

wife

and

then

strangled

her

to

unconsciousness in a violent domestic dispute. R162:81,83-84,86-88,108,111.

* * *
Defendant and Ann Hilton had been married less than a month vvhen
Ann's work transferred her to Utah from South Carolina. R162:102-03. The
couple moved to Salt Lake City with Ann's then 14-year-old son, Anthony.
R162:73. Defendant, Ann, and Anthony, stayed in a motel when they first
arrived. R162:104. Defendant drove Ann to and from her work; he was not
working. R162:105.
After Defendant picked up Ann from work on 15 January 2015, the
couple began drinking and arguing a little in their motel ro01n. R162:92,105.
At one point, Defendant got into bed and put his drink on the nightstand.
,.;;,

R162:76. Ann took the drink off the nightstand and put it in the freezer. Id.
Defendant got out of bed, removed the drink from the freezer, and put it
back on the nightstand. Id. After Ann then poured the drink down the sink,
Defendant got back out of bed and "cold cocked" her on the right side of

1

Because this is an appeal from a jury verdict, the State presents the
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88,
13, n.2, 361 P.3d 104.
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her face.

R162:76-77,130.

Ann "fell against the refrigerator" and "slid

halfway down to the floor," .,,holding her face." R162:78. Defendant lay
back down on the bed. R162:78. 2
Ann got back up and began searching Defendant's jacket for her debit
card and the keys to the family van. R162:78. Upon finding her keys, Ann
put them in her pocket. R162:79. Defendant again got out of bed, came up
behind Ann, and-after putting his right arm around her throat-lifted Ann
onto her toes, using his left hand to search her pockets for the van keys.
R162:79,81,110-111. When Defendant could not find the keys, he grabbed

his right hand with his left and- again squeezing Ann's throat-lifted her
completely off the floor. R162:80.
Anthony watched his mother struggle unsuccessfully to free herself.

Id. at 84. He also heard her make "choking sounds" just before "her eyes
like rolled back in her head and she went limp." Id. at 84-85. Defendant
then "pushed" Ann away from him and-after grabbing the van keys and
his belongings- fled the motel room. Id. at 86-87. Ann "fell against the wall
with her face and just sat there," remaining unconscious for approximately
a minute. Id. at 86-88. Anthony dialed 911. R162:88.
2

While Anthony recalled that the punch knocked his 1nother down,
Ann did not recall falling after Defendant hit her. See R162:109. But she did
remember Defendant saying, "Yes, I hit the bitch this time." Id.

-4-

Officer Fano, from the South Salt Lake Police Department, responded.
R162:134.

He noted visible 1narks above Ann's right eye, and "what

appeared to be very fresh red marks on her neck," which itself "appeared
swollen." R162:139; see also State's Exhibits 3-5. Ann declined to be taken to
a hospital because she did not want to leave Anthony alone; in any event,
none of her injuries required immediate medical attention. R162:114,149. 3
Ann told Officer Pano that she had difficulty remembering what happened
because she was in a state of shock. R162:112. After talking to Anthony,
Officer Pano called Defendant's cellphone. R162:138,141. Defendant did not
answer the first few calls. R162:141. Eventually, Defendant answered, and
after the officer identified himself, Defendant said, "I'm driving out of the
state, don't worry about me," and hung up. R162:141. Officer Pano called
Defendant a second time and received the same response. R162:142. When
Officer Pano called a third time, Defendant said "there's nothing to talk
about," "you can believe whatever you want to believe," and "suck my d3

Ann saw a doctor approximately 10 days later for an unrelated
thumb injury, and because her "head was hurting." R162:125. The medical
record of that visit indicated that Ann was "assaulted about one week ago,"
that she continued "to have pain, face, neck and left thumb," that she uwas
hit to the face and choked," but that she was experiencing "no numbness,
no weakness," although her neck was "[p]ositive for pain with movement."
R162:131. The report further stated that Ann had "[m]ild, tender, swelling
around the right eye," and that her neck muscles were tender. Id.
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k," before hanging up. R162:142. Further attempts to call Defendant were
unsuccessful. R162:142.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault causing serious
bodily injury, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b),
(2)(b) (West 2015). 4 Rl-2. "'Serious Bodiiy Injury' means bodily injury that
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a
substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-601(11) (West 2015).
Before trial, both parties filed notice that they planned to call experts
to testify about strangulation. See R35,81.
The State also proposed a jury instruction that stated the statutory
definition of "serious bodily injury" -i.e., "injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death." R77 (quoting Section 76-1-601(11)).

4

Additionally, the State

The State cites to the current aggravated assault statute because,
although the 2015 amendment rewrote subsection 76-5-103(1 ), it effected no
substantive change. Rather, the 2015 amendment merely incorporated the
language of the assault statute that the aggravated assault statute had
previously referenced solely by citation.
-6-

requested an instruction "that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness
constitutes serious bodily injury." R78.
Defense counsel opposed the strangulation instruction on the ground
that it took

O

that factual decision that the jury [has] to make on that

particular element out of their hands" and violated his right to have the
"jury find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt" "every element of
the offense." R162:4 (pertinent transcript pages are attached in Addendum
B).

Defense counsel argued that his expert would testify that it was

possible to choke someone to unconsciousness without causing serious
bodily injury. R162:4-5. Counsel argued that the instruction was akin to the
trial court improperly "taking judicial notice of a particular set of facts and
informing the jury that this set of facts has this legal consequence." R162:6.
The prosecutor argued that the proposed strangulation instruction
was based on two Utah Supreme Court decisions, State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186
(Utah 1988), and State v. Fisher, 680 P.2d 35 (Utah 1984), both holding that
strangulation is serious bodily injury. R162:6-10. The prosecutor disputed
that the proposed strangulation instruction took an element of aggravated
assault from the jury; rather, it was" an instruction on what the law is. The
jury is still the finder of fact." R162:10-11. For example, the jury still had to
detennine whether the evidence supported beyond a reasonable doubt that
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Defendant strangled Ann, and if so, whether he strangled her to
unconsciousness.

R162:1 l,15.

Finally, the prosecutor disputed that the

defense expert should be allowed to testify that unconsciousness did not
constitute serious bodily injury. R162:11,14.
On

rebuttal,

defense

counsel

reiterated

that

the

proposed

strangulation instruction violated Defendant's constitutional right to a jury
verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

R162:19.

Defense

counsel also clarified that his expert would not testify that unconsciousness
did not constitute serious bodily injury; rather, he would "explain ... the
sort of different levels of injury ... without making that legal conclusion."
R162:20.
The trial court ruled that the State's proposed strangulation
instruction was "a correct statement of law," and adopted it. R162:21; see
also R109 (Instruction 18) (copies of all pertinent Instructions are attached in

Addendum C).
The State ultimately elected not to call an expert.

Defendant

presented expert testimony from a former emergency room doctor- Dr.
Rothfeder.

See R162:156-166.

Rothfeder testified that strangulation can

result in two types of injuries- i.e., neck fractures and brain damage.
R162:158-159. While fractures could occur in a matter of seconds, it would
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take approximately 2-3 minutes of sustained compression to cause brain
damage. R162:159,165. According to Rothfeder, it was "not realistic that 15
seconds of manual compression" would "cause death by brain damage."
R162:165.

However, applying pressure to the carotid sinus could cause

someone to faint in as little as ten to fifteen seconds, but the person would
also quickly recover once the pressure was removed. R162:161. Rothfeder
explained that this type of "submission hold" is used by professional cage
fighters because it "is specifically aimed at putting pressure on the carotid
sinus and the carotid artery so people go to sleep in, you know, maybe 10
seconds if that." Id. Rothfeder also described the physical symptoms of a
strangulation injury, e.g., petechia, or pin-sized hemorrhages "in the whites
of the eyes," and "in the skin of the face." R162:164. Also, "ligature marks,"
or "bruising from gripping and fingertips," and "cracks or fractures in the
neck cartilages." Id. According to Rothfeder, an intoxicated person's brain
is "more fragile." Id.
On cross examination, Rothfeder acknowledged that he had not
worked in an emergency room for nearly a decade, and that he had not seen
any strangulation patients in that time.

R162:167-168.

He also

acknowledged that it was possible for a person to be strangled to
unconsciousness without exhibiting any signs of petechial hemorrhage or
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the other symptoms he described. See R162:171-172. He also affirmed that
he had never conducted any original research or published any articles or
books, including chapters in books, on strangulation; nor had he read any
books on strangulation. R162:172.
The trial court instructed jurors on aggravated assault causing serious
bodily injury, see R111 (Instruction 20), and two lesser included offenses:
aggravated assault likely to cause serious bodily injury, and assault, see
R108,110,112-113 (Instructions 17,19,21,&22).

The trial court included

instructions on bodily injury- i.e., "physical pain, illness or an impairment
or physical condition," an element of the lesser-included offense of assault,
and serious bodily injury-Le., "injury that creates or causes serious
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of
any bodily 1nember or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death," an
element of both the charged offense (aggravated assault causing serious
bodily injury) and the first lesser-included offense (aggravated assault likely
to cause serious bodily injury). R108 (Instruction 17). As noted, the trial
court also

instructed jurors

that "strangulation to

the

point

of

unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury." R109 (Instruction 18). 5

5

Copies of pertinent instructions are attached in Addendum B.
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r:,

~

In closing, the prosecutor argued that jurors should convict
Defendant of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, as opposed
to either of the two lesser included offenses, because the evidence showed
that Defendant strangled Ann to unconsciousness. See R162:196-200.
Defense

counsel

disputed

that

Defendant

choked

Ann

to

unconsciousness, challenging both Ann and Anthony's credibility on the
basis that their "memories have changed about what happened," and that
"the allegations just seem to get worse as time goes by." R162:204. Counsel
also emphasized Rothfeder' s testimony that it would take two to three
minutes of choking to induce brain injury or death, and that while
strangling someone for ten to fifteen seconds could cause unconsciousness,
the person could also quick! y regain consciousness and go "back to
normal." R162:206. But even if Ann did pass out here, counsel disputed
whether that was a result of Defendant's strangulation or of Ann hitting her
head when she fell. R162:206,210.
Counsel also argued that jurors should acquit Defendant of the
charged and lesser-included offenses, but acknowledged that Ann suffered
bodily injury; therefore, the lesser-included-offense of simple assault made
"the most sense." R162:207.

In support, counsel argued that temporary
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unconsciousness did not constitute serious bodily injury under the statutory
definition of serious bodily:
That is not protracted mJury, that is not permanent
disfigurement, that is not impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ or creating a substantial risk of death.
Not all choking situations are created equally and this was one
where it should have never happened if it happened, but ...
Ann went on with her life without interruption.
R162:208.

Because Ann suffered at most temporary unconsciousness,

counsel argued that the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that she suffered serious bodily injury.

R162:209-10.

Defense counsel

concluded that the evidence did not therefore support "either of the
varieties" of aggravated assault in the jury instructions and jurors should
therefore convict Defendant of the lesser-included offense of assault: "This
was an assault, plain and simple, this was an assault and that's how you
should come back with your verdict." R162:210.
On rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated that under Utah law,
"strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily
injury." R162:213. Jurors thus needed only to determine whether Ann in
fact lost consciousness. Id. If jurors were "firmly convinced that she was
strangled to unconsciousness," then Defendant "was guilty of aggravated
assault with serious bodily injury. It's that simple." .ld.
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During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court to define
"constitutes" as that term was used in Insh·uction 18- the strangulation
instruction: "What is the definition of constitutes as in Instruction 18?"
R162:221; see also Rl 17. After conferring with the parties, the trial court

instructed the jury as follows: "Use the common and ordinary meaning of
the word. A dictionary meaning is to amount to or add up to." R162:224.
Defense counsel objected to only the last sentence of the instruction, where
the trial court provided an actual dictionary meaning of the term. Id.
The jury convicted Defendant of the first lesser-included offense,
aggravated assault likely to cause serious bodily injury. R87. The trial court
imposed the statutory prison tenn of zero-to-five years.

R145. The trial

court then suspended the prison term and placed Defendant probation for
48-months. Id. Thereafter, at Defendant's request, the trial court amended
the sentence to re-impose the statutory prison term. R150.

Defendant

timely appealed. R152.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
.

'::\

Defendant argues that the trial court's strangulation instruction-

~

" strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily
injury" - did not comport with Utah law and thus took an element away
from the jury. But the Utah Supreme Court has long held that strangulation
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to unconsciousness constitutes serious bodily injury as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the trial court's instruction was a correct statement of Utah
law that this Court is bound to uphold.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT STRANGULATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS
SERIOUS BODILY INJURY

Defendant argues that the trial court's strangulation instruction took
an element away from the jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. R109 (Instruction 18); see Aplt.Br.12. Defendant argues that
"whether an act of choking constitutes force likely to cause serious bodily
injury and whether the injury caused by an act of choking constitutes
serious bodily injury are questions for the jury." Aplt.Br.15. In support,
Defendant cites a sufficiency case from the Utah Supreme Court, two cases
from this Court,

11

extra-jurisdictional cases," and Utah's "non-criminal

code." See Aplt.Br.19-25. But under decades-old authority from the Utah
Supreme Court, strangulation to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury as
a matter of law. See State v. Fishet, 680 P.2d 35, 37 (Utah 1984). The trial
court's strangulation instruction was thus a correct statement of law that
this Court is bound to uphold.
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***
Under Utah's graduated statutory sche1ne, a person commits assault,
a class B misdemeanor, when, with unlawful force or violence, he "causes
bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1)-(2) (West 2015). "'Bodily injury'
means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition."
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-1-601(3) (West 2015).
A person is guilty of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, when
the assault is accomplished by "means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b)-(2)(a) (emphasis
added). A person is guilty of aggravated assault, a second degree felony,
when the assault "results in serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103(2)(b) (emphasis added). "Serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury that
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a
substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11).
For purposes of the aggravated assault statute, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that strangulation to unconsciousness is serious bodily
injury as a matter of law. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. In Fisher, the defendant
fatally strangled a prostitute whom he suspected was having an affair with
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his wife.

See 680 P.2d at 36. He "was charged with three variations of

second degree murder: intent to kill, intent to cause serious bodily injury,
and acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life."

Id. at 37.

In opening statement, the prosecutor said that

Fisher's friend would testify that Fisher repeatedly threatened the victim's
life, declared that if he could "do away" with her, then his wife "would
come back to him," and also described "different methods" that he would
use to kill the victim, including strangulation. Id. Although Fisher's friend
testified to most of these statements at preliminary hearing, and was
subpoenaed to testify at Fisher's trial, the friend ultimately refused to testify
"due to threats he had received from fellow inmates at the Utah State
Prison."

Id.

Fisher moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial based on the

prosecutor's opening statement. Id.
Although Fisher's friend did not testify, the State produced other
evidence of Fisher's intent that "was not as strong as it would have been
under the anticipated testimony," but which still "gave the jury a basis to
infer [Fisher's] intent to kill" the victim. Id. at 38. Fisher also testified and
admitted the strangulation, but claimed that he did not intend to kill the
victim. Id. Rather, he testified that he intended only that the victim go
unconscious. Id. at 36. The jury convicted Fisher of second degree murder,
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but its general verdict did not specify which of the three variations of
murder it had relied upon. Id. at 37.
On appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court's denial of a
mistrial on two grounds: first, notwithstanding the prosecutor's opening
statement, other "independent, credible evidence" sufficed to support a jury
verdict on the first variation, that Fisher intended to kill the victim.

Id.

Second, and "[m]ore importantly," the evidence amply supported a jury
verdict on the second variation- i.e., intent to commit serious bodily
injury-where Fisher "testified that he intentionally placed his hands on the
victim's neck, that he intentionally squeezed her throat, and that he
intended to 'get her to go unconscious."' Id. The supreme court explained
that Fisher "intentionally committed an act that is dangerous to human life
(strangulation), intending to cause serious bodily injury (protracted loss or
impairment of both the heart and the brain, i.e., unconsciousness)." Id. The
supreme court therefore held that "strangulation constitutes 'serious bodily
injury."' Id.

Given the factual context, Fisher's holding may be more

precisely read as being that strangulation that results in unconsciousness is
serious bodily injury. See id. The court then observed that its holding was
"consistent with the case law on this question," citing, e.g., State v. King, 604
P.2d 923 (Utah 1979), where it had upheld a jury finding of '"serious bodily
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injury'" in an aggravated sexual assault case where King strangled the
victim to unconsciousness and stabbed her with scissors. Fisher, 680 P.2d at
37, n.3.

Shortly after Fisher was decided, the supreme court decided State v.

Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984), an aggravated assault case. Peterson
broke in to the victim's home and strangled her, causing her to "black out"

Q

briefly. Id. at 1219. On appeal, Peterson challenged the trial court's refusal
to reduce his aggravated assault conviction to a simple assault. Id. at 1218.
He argued that the evidence did not show that he caused serious bodily
injury to the victim where she required no medical attention and suffered
no

II

permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the

functions of any bodily member or organ." Id. at 1218-1219. He further
II

argued that what bodily injury she did suffer did not create a substantial
risk of death." Id. at 1219.
But the issue in Peterson was not whether the defendant caused
serious bodily injury. Rather, the issue was only whether he used means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, because the
prosecution had a1nended the Information to charge only that variant of
aggravated assault. Id. The supreme court affirmed Peterson's aggravated
assault conviction because he

II

attacked [the victim], placed his hands
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G

around her neck and applied sufficient pressure to cause her to black out,"
which conduct "clearly could have caused the death or serious bodily injury
of [the victim] and was therefore sufficient under the statute." Id. Peterson
thus recognizes that strangulation is at least "means or force likely to cause
serious bodily injury." Id. Granted, in reaching this result, Peterson neither
cited to nor acknowledged Fisher. But there was no reason to do so, where,
unlike in Fisher, the State did not have to prove that Peterson intended to, or
actually caused, serious bodily injury. Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1219.
A few years later, in State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988), the
supreme court reaffirmed that strangulation constitutes means or force
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, even when the victim does not
go unconscious. Speer broke into his former wife's home and assaulted her
in various ways, including dragging her by her hair back inside the home
when she tried to escape and grabbing her by the throat-choking her. Id.
at 188. When Mrs. Speer received a phone call during the incident, Speer
"threw down the phone and knocked her against a dresser." Id. The caller,
overhearing the struggle, called police.

Id.

Speer was arrested shortly

thereafter, and his former wife was "taken to the hospital, where she was
treated and released." Id.
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At trial, Speer testified and "admitted choking Mrs. Speer about the
throat until, by her testimony, she almost passed out." Id. at 191. The trial
court instructed the jury on "aggravated assault, aggravated burglary,
aggravated kidnapping, and kidnapping." Id. at 188. Speer did not request
or receive instructions on the lesser included offenses of burglary or assault.

Id. The aggravated assault instruction included the "means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury" ele1nent. Id. The jury ultimately
acquitted Speer of kidnapping, but convicted him of both aggravated
burglary and aggravated assault. Id.
On appeal, Speer argued that the trial court committed manifest error
in not insh~ucting the jury "on lesser included offenses of simple assault and
simple burglary." Id. at 190. The supreme court rejected Speer's argument,
holding that "under our statutory requirements," Speer "would not have
been entitled to instructions on the lesser offenses, even if he had requested
them." Id. A court is not "'obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included
offense."' Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1978)). The supreme
court held that there was no rational basis for acquitting Speer of
aggravated assault and convicting him of only assault because it was
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"uncontroverted" that Speer-who had admitted choking his former wife"used 'force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury,' thereby
satisfying the requirements" of the aggravated assault statute, section 76-5103(1)(b) (" other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury"). Speer, 750 P.2d at 190. In support, the supreme court cited Fisher,
680 P.2d at 37, where it had earlier held that "strangulation constitutes
'serious bodily injury."' Id. at 191, n.4.

Fisher held that strangling a victim to unconsciousness constitutes
serious bodily injury as a matter of law. 680 P.2d at 37. Speer recognized
the validity of this holding. See 750 P.2d at 191, n.4. Instruction 18 therefore
correctly stated the law.
Defendant

nevertheless

disputes

that

strangulation

to

unconsciousness is serious bodily injury as a matter of law, citing a
sufficiency case from the supreme court, State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah
1979), two cases from this court, State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, 63 P.3d
110 and State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930 (Utah App. 1991), "extra-jurisdictional
cases/' and Utah's "non-criminal code."

See Aplt.Br.19-25. Defendant's

reliance on these authorities is unavailing.
First, Defendant argues that King somehow limits Fisher, or that Fisher
did not hold that strangulation to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury
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as a matter of law because it relied on King, and other extra-jurisdictional
cases, all of which were only sufficiency cases. See Aplt.Br.19. But Fisher's
reliance on King and other sufficiency cases does not limit Fisher. The Fisher
court held that any error regarding the prosecutor's opening statement in
that case was harmless because Fisher's admission- that he intended to
strangle the murder victim to unconsciousness - established as a matter of
law that he committed second degree murder.

See 680 P.2d at 37. The

supreme court's citation to King and the other sufficiency cases supports,
but does not limit this holding. Indeed, the error in Fisher could not have
been harmless if a factual issue remained about whether Fisher had
admitted an intent to cause serious bodily injury. See id.
Defendant next argues that a case from this Court, Bloomfield,
somehow limits the supreme court cases, Fisher and Speer, and that another
case from this Court, Boone, limits yet another supreme court case, Peterson.

See Aplt.Br.21.

But even assuming that Defendant correctly characterizes

Bloomfield and Boone, neither case could limit authority from a higher
court-i.e. the Utah Supreme Court. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399,
n.3 (Utah 1994) (recognizing "lower courts are obliged to follow the holding
of a higher court" under vertical stare decisis).
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In Bloomfield, the defendant beat the victiln to unconsciousness - the
victim did not regain consciousness until the next day- and the question on
appeal was whether beating someone to unconsciousness satisfied the
"serious bodily injury" ele1nent of aggravated robbery. 2003 UT App 3, if 18.
As Defendant points out, Bloomfield observes that no Utah case had
previously addressed this question directly. See id. ("No Utah cases have
directly addressed this question."); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101(11)
(defining serious bodily injury). 6 However, Bloomfield goes on to recognize
that several" cases" suggest that a jury may find that an assault resulting in
II

temporary unconsciousness meets the statutory definition of serious bodily
injury." Id. (citing, e.g., Peterson, 681 P.2d 1219, and Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37).

Bloomfield thus correctly holds that it was '"within the province of the jury
to consider the means and n1anner by which the victim's injuries were
inflicted along with the attendant circumstances' in determining whether
Bloomfield caused serious bodily injury."

Id.

The Court upheld

Blo01n£ield's aggravated robbery conviction because the evidence "was
sufficient for the jury to d etennine that [Blo01n£ield' s] beating" of the victim

6

The State cites the current s tatute w hich has been renumbered since
Bloomfield was decided.

-23-

"caused serious bodily in.jury within the meaning of" the aggravated
robbery and serious bodily injury statutes. Id.
In arguing that Bloomfield somehow lilnits Fisher and Speer,
Defendant apparently reads Bloomfield's holding that "a jury may find that
an assault resulting in te1nporary unconsciousness" is serious bodily injury,
to mean that a jury may also find to the contrary-i.e., that it is not serious
bodily injury. See Aplt.Br.22-23. Defendant then posits that the Bloomfield
court's observation that no Utah case had directly addressed the question
whether beating someone to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury
s01nehow limits Fisher and Speer. See Aplt.Br.22-23. But this observation
does no such thing.
Turning fist to Fisher, the issues in Fisher and Bloomfield were distinct.
As explained, Fisher held that sh·angulation to unconsciousness is serious
bodily injury because that act directly causes protracted loss or impainnent
of both the heart and brain. Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. Bloomfield addressed a
different question-i.e., whether beating someone to unconsciousness is
serious bodily injury. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,118. Thus, Bloomfield's
observation that no court, including the Fisher court, had addressed this
precise question does not somehow lin1it Fisher. Rather, Fisher supports the

Bloomfield holding.

If, as Fisher holds, sh·angulation to unconscious is
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serious bodily injury as a matter of law, see Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37, then an
assault resulting in unconsciousness is necessarily serious bodily injury as a
matter of law, see Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, if 18. In any event, Bloomfield is
a decision of a lower court and thus could not- even if it purported to limit Fisher. See Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, n.3.
The same holds true for Defendant's suggestion that Bloomfield limits

Speer, which case Bloomfield does not even cite to or acknowledge.
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ,118; see also Aplt.Br.21.

See

Speer, like Fish.er,

addressed a different issue than Bloomfied. The issue in Speer was whether
strangulation is means or force likely to cause serious bodily injury. See

Speer, 750 P.2d at 191. Thus, Bloomfield's recognition that beating someone
to unconsciousness is serious bodily injury does not limit Speer. Rather,

Speer reinforces Bloomfield's holding that it is within the province of a jury to
find that an assault that results in unconsciousness is serious bodily injury.
2003 UT App 3, if 18. But again, even if Bloomfield had purported to do so, it
could not limit Speer. See Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399, n.3.
As for Defendant's reliance on Boone, he incorrectly characterizes

Boone as a supreme court opinion that purports to limit another supreme
court opinion, Peterson. See Aplt.Br.21. But Boone is a court of appeals case;
thus, even if Boone purported to limit Peterson it could not have done so. See
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Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399, n.3. Moreover, Boone is an aggravated burglary
case that turned on the definition of "bodily injury," not "serious bodily
injury."

See Boone, 820 P.2d at 936.

In any event, to the extent that

Defendant reasonably characterizes Boone as suggesting that Peterson "noted
that strangulation to the point of brief unconsciousness did not constitute
serious bodily injury," Aplt.Br.21 (citing Boone, 820 P.2d at 936), both
Q

Defendant and Boone mischaracterize Peterson.
As shown, Peterson interpreted a former version of the aggravated
assault statute and recognized that while one subsection of that statute
required proof of intent to cause serious bodily injury, the subsection
Peterson was charged under required "only that the actor used means or
force likely to have that result."

Peterson, 681 P.2d at 1219. Thus, the

supreme court was not asked to consider-and did not have to decide-if
strangulation with unconsciousness constituted serious bodily injury in

Peterson. Id.
Finally, Defendant's reliance on "extra-jurisdictional cases not cited in

Fisher," and Utah's "non-criminal code" is as unavailing as his reliance on
King, Bloomfield, and Boone. Aplt.Br.20,25. Regardless of what courts in
other states may have decided, Fisher controls in Utah and has interpreted
section 76-1-601(11) to mclude strangulation to unconsciousness as a matter
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of law. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37. It is similarly insignificant that the other
definitions of serious bodily injury in Utah's criminal or civil code may or
may not expressly include unconsciousness. Section 76-1-601(11) controls
the definition of serious bodily injury for purposes of the aggravated assault
statute and the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted that section to include
strangulation to unconsciousness. See Fisher, 680 P.2d at 37.
Given all of the above, the trial court's strangulation instruction was a
correct statement of Utah law that this Court must uphold.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on March 23, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

~~~~IANDECKER

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for A ppellee
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•

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 5. Offenses Against the Person (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. Assault and Related Offenses
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103
§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault--Penalties

•

•

•

Currentness
(1) Aggravated assault is an actor's conduct:

(a) that is:

(i) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;

(ii) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or

(iii) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another; and

•

(b) that includes the use of:

(i) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or

•

(ii) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.

(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (1) is a third degree felony, except under Subsection (2)(b) .

•
•

•

(b) A violation of Subsection ( 1) that results in serious bodily injury is a second degree felony.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
2010, c. 193, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2010; Laws 2015, c. 430, § 2, eff. May 12, 2015 .
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@

20'!6 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

•

§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault--Penalties, UT ST§ 76-5-103

Notes of Decisions (140)

•

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103, UT ST§ 76-5-103
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document

((';>

2016 Thomson Reuters . No c.laim to original U.S. Government Works.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
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2016 Th omson Reuters. No cia irn to original U.S . Government Works.
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•

•

•

§ 76-1-601. Definitions, UT ST§ 76-1-601

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annas)
Part 6. Definitions
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-1-601

•

•

•

•

§ 76-1-601.

Definitions

Currentness
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:

(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.

(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.

(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

(4) "Conduct" means an a~t or omission .

(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:

•

(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or

(b) a facsimile or representation of the item, if:

•

(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or

(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item .

•

(6) "Grievous sexual offense" means:

(a) rape, Section 76-5-402;

•

(b) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;

(c) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;

•

V✓ ESlLi\'0/

S) 20·i6 Thornson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

•

§ 76-1-601. Definitions, UT ST § 76-1-601
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(d) object rape ofa child, Section 76-5-402.3;

•

(e) forcible sodomy, Subsection 76-5-403(2);

(t) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;

•

(g) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Subsection 76-5-404.1(4);

(h) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;

(i) any felony attempt to commit an offense described in Subsections (6)(a) through (h); or

•

G) an offense in another state, territory, or district of the United States that, if committed in Utah, would constitute an offense
described in Subsections (6)(a) through (i).

e

(7) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.

•

(8) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting.

(9) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.

•

(10) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.

(11) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.

(12) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted
physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

(13) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other
method of recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being preserved.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-601; Laws 1989, c. 170, § l; Laws 1995, c. 244, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c . 291, § 1, eff.
May I, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 205, § 26, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2007, c. 339, § 2, eff. April 30, 2007.
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FEBRUARY 24, 2015

2

JUDGE MARK KOURIS

3

(Transcriber's note:

Identification of speakers

4

may not be accurate with the audio recordings.)
PROCEEDINGS

5

THE COURT:

6

Good morning.

I've assembled,

as you

7

can see,

preliminary set of instructions that I put

8

together _ast night that you can look through when you have a

9

minute.

1

:hat said, I know that we want to talk about the
I've

10

strangulation instruction that Mr. Leavitt has offered.

11

had a chance to read both cases that you refer to last night.

12

I guess, Mr. Sikora, response to that?

13

MR. SIKORA:

14

Your Honor,

Yes,

just one moment, Your Honor.

I think the appropriate instruction to

15

inform th8 jury of what serious bodily injury is, is actually

16

the definition of serious bodily injury under Utah law which

17

is 76-1-6)1(11) and that definition is,

18

bodily injury means bodily injury that creates or causes

19

serious p·~rmanent disfigurement, protracted loss or

20

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or

21

creates a substantial risk of death.

22

has done :here is taken a case, that particular factual

23

pattern in a case and then interweaved that factual pattern

24

with the jury instruction that it wants and I don't th~nk

25

that that's the appropriate way to do it.

uThe term serious

•

I

I think what the State

G
1

1

THE COURT: Let me ask by the same token, it seems

2

like you' re done a very similar thing with regard to all the

3

self defe1se instructions.

4

MR. SIKORA:

5

THE COURT:

6

The self defense
- don't we just take the self defense

statutory instruction and give that to them?
MR. SIKORA:

7

8

Why -

Well,

I'm going to be removing that

anyway because we're not going to be running that defense.

9

I THE COURT:

10

MR. SIKORA:

Oh, okay.
Yeah, but most of the.defense -

11

I'd have to know,

12

because s,.,me of those I am just parroting the statute.

13
14
15

16

you know, which ones you're talking about

THE COURT:
directly

and

Right, but there are others that co~e

)Ut of cases that you pulled.
MR. SIKORA:

That may be.

The problem now is we're

talking a)out an element.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SIKORA:

Okay.
We're talking about an element of'the

19

offense which is the jury has to find serious bodily injury

20

in order

21

there is a particular factual scenario that the Court is

22

telling the jury in that jury instruction, this is serious

23

bodily ir.: jury.

24
25

to

convict my client.

THE COURT:
has told 11s?

Now, what is happening

is

But isn't that what the Supreme Court

I lean, the reason we're doing that because the
2

1

Supreme Court in that one instance has said this is the

2

definition and by the way, this qualifies under the

3

definition, right?

MR. SIKORA:

4

Well, the question then becomes,

is

5

that really - I'm not sure though that's what the Suprem~

6

Court is 3aying in those two cases.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SIKORA:

9

Oh, okay.
Okay.

Because what the Supreme Court

is not sa,ing in either of those cases is that they're not

10

making th1t connection to an appropriate jury instruction in

11

a given criminal case.

12

this person's conviction, we believe that the conviction

13

should be affirmed and that under the circumstances

14

presented, the choking in this case rises to the level of

15

serious bodily injury.

They're saying based on our review of

I think if you read that too far,

16

you're then

17

saying th3t a defense, the defendant is actually foreclosed

18

from even arguing otherwise in a case.

19

sort of,

20

it's almo;t being used as fact preclusion or collateral

21

estoppel, that now we're being estopped from even arguing

22

that choking to the point of unconsciousness, if that's what

23

happened,· rises to the level of serious bodily injury.

24

jury is being told that choking to the point of

25

unconsciousness rises to the level of serious bodily injury.

It almost appears as

you know, to look at the civil prospective of it,

The

3

,·,.;<\
~

1

You're ba3ically taking that factual decision that the jurors

2

have to m~ke on that particular element out of their hands

3

and I thi .1k it runs very close then at that point to

4

violating my client's right to have the jury find unanimously

5

and beyonj a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense

6

because it almost is getting very close and maybe is the

7

equivaler,t of a judicial finding and then dictating to the

8

jury, this has already been proven.

9

that particular element, that I think it does run very close,

That's my concern with

10

if not ov~r the line of violating my client's constitutional

11

right to ceasonable doubt on every element of the offense.

12

THE COURT:

Well, if we argue it backwards then,

13

are you s 1ying that there's a possibility that you could_.

14

choke a p~rson to unconsciousness and there could be a

15

situation where that would not be serious bodily injury?

16

MR. SIKORA:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SIKORA:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SIKORA:

Yes, I am and that's Tell me what - that's - that would - what my medical expert will talk

I've designated Dr. Rothfeder as my expert in this

21

about.

22

case and ·1e 's going to say that there are ways that

23

unconsciousness might occur after a very short period of

24

time, eve·,1 10 seconds which is what the evidence is in this-

25

case, the State's evidence is in this case, but as soon as

1

4

1

the pressure is released, everything goes back to normal and

2

there is no serious bodily injury.

3

the other thing, in that particular -

4

cases doe~ it appear that there was any scientific evidence,

5

it looks

6

based on .~o particular science that serious bodily injury

7

results f.,:om choking to the point of unconsciousness.

8

of those ·:ases I'm not sure that unconsciousness even

9

occurred as I recall.

So the one thing -

t~at's

in neither of those

Like the appellate court just sort of concluded

f .. :·.

~

In one

10

Here's some of the examples I want to bring up.

If

11

this is legitimate, if this is a kosher way of creating a

12

jury instruction, of blending the facts with the law,

13

we'd also get into that situation with,

14

was thinking about it in terms of cruel and heinous murder

15

under the aggravated assault statute.

16

that says\nine stab wounds equals cruel and heinous murder,

17

then you -:ould have another aggravated murder case subsequent

18

to that w:1ere maybe there were 12 stab wounds and the

19

would be told in a jury instruction, you are, you are

20

instructej that nine or more stab wounds to the back equals

21

cruel and heinous murder.

22

of that that you can come up with where you have a reported

23

case that the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has decided

24

and they've decided it on a particular set of facts and then

25

you can t1ke those set of facts because that fits with the

Q

then I,

let's say the way I

If you have a case

jury

There are any number of examples

5

t
l

1

\

G

1

prosecuti)n's case and then form a jury instruction based on

2

the set

3

appropriate way to inform the jury and I think it's an

4

unconstitutional way of informing the jury.

o:

facts in that case.

I don't think that that's an

I think that my client has a right to present the

5
6

evidence, the jury is the fact finder,

this isn't a civil

7

case and the jury has to make that determination of proof

8

beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the

9

offense without basically, you know, the Court taking

10

judicial notice of a particular set of facts and informing

11

the jury that this set of facts has this legal consequence
I

i

12

and I thi1k that's what that jury instruction does.
The other part of it is if you look at the State's

13
14

instructi~n, the first paragraph talks about force of means

15

likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

16

THE COURT: Right.

17

MR. SIKORA: And I'm not sure that the cases support

18

that.

I think that the cases do talk about strangulation to

19

the point of unconsciousness.

20

I don't k\1ow - and maybe I read those cases sort of quickly

21

but it se~med to me that's, that was for the most part what

22

they were: talking about was the unconsciousness problem,

23

I may be ~rong about that.

I

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. LEAVITT:

That first part of it though,

but

Mr. Leavitt?
Your Honor, first of all,

just a

6

1

again a ~uick factual background, what we have a good faith

2

belief th~t the evidence is going to show in this case.

3

believe t~e testimony of a couple of witnesses is that,

4

indeed, t·!1e allegations are that Mr. Walker, the defendant,

5

strangledithe victim in this case until her eyes rolled back

6

in her he1d, her body went limp and she fell to the floor,

7

indicating everything, every level of unconsciousness.

8

yes, is v2ry similar to these cases but what the Court is not

9

doing by ~iving this instruction is making a finding for

:I

i

10

them.

11

the actual law is in the state of Utah.

Wh3t the Court is doing is instructing them on what

12

13

For

example, in Fisher - and do you have a

copy

with you?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. LEAVITT:

16

That,

one.

17

I do.
I've got a courtesy copy if you need

You all ... okay.
So,

in Fisher what that was - and a lot of Mr.

18

Sikora's example, those are sufficiency of the evidence

19

cases.

20

appealed and they said there wasn't sufficient evidence to

21

convict me of this charge and then the Court affirmed it.

22

That's not the situation here.

23

murder ca~e and he had strangled someone and her neck snapped

24

and she died.

25

intend to kill her and so the context of this quote in Fisher

If someone was convicted of something and then they

What Fisher was, Fisher ,vas a

At trial Mr. Fisher was claiming he didn't

7

1

- of this language in Fisher and it's on,

2

the West Law printout, it's just right before Page 38 of:the

3

Reporter, they get two different ways of proving murder.

4

Intention~l murder, but then there's also this, an act

5

clearly dangerous to human life intending to cause serious

6

bodily injury.

7

He was cl1iming that I didn't intend to, that he didn't

8

intend to kill them and actually the context of this is that
•.

9

the prosecutor's statements whether about intent were

I guess Page 4 of

So this wasn't a sufficiency of the evidence.

10

imperfect.

That's the context of this discussion and wh~t

11

the Court does is the Court says, Look, yeah, what the

12

prosecutor said that witness didn't testify but it doesn't

13

matter because clearly, under these facts,

14

made a difference because then they go into this definition

15

of serious bodily injury.

16

interpreting a statute.

17

statutes ind then the courts interpret those statutes and

18

that also becomes - that's what a holding is.

19

do it and here they're interpreting that statute, serious

20

bodily injury, the exact definition that Mr. Sikora is

21

proposing

22

give the definition and they say, "the defendant's conduct

23

falls squarely within the (inaudible) second degree murder.

24

He testified he intentionally placed his hands on her neck,

25

intentioLally squeezed her throat and intended her to go

it wouldn't have

And the context, they're
That's what the law is.

There's

That's how we

the exact definition in the statute and then they

8

1

unconscid1s.

In other words, the defendant intentionally

2

committed an act endangering life, strangulation, intending

3

to cause

4

irnpairmen~ of both the heart and brain, i.e.

5

unconsciousness."

6

unconsciousness.

;erious bodily injury,

i.e. protracted loss or

So they talk about strangulation and

7

Now, is this dicta?

Is this their reasoning?

8

After that look at the words,

9

constitutes serious bodily injury is consistent with case law

uour holding that strangulation

10

on the question" and then they cite cases from other

11

jurisdictLons.

12

They used the word holding.

13

unconscio.1sness is serious bodily injury.

14

question, the same court, Utah Supreme Court, four years

15

later in Spear had an issues come up where a victim was

16

strangled until she almost passed out and on that one the

17

context of this one -

Now, is there a question that was a holding?
The court's holding
If there was any

18

Do you both have a copy of this one as well?

19

THE COURT:

-20

MR. LEAVITT:

Yes.
Okay.

The context of the Spear case

21

is dealinq with a submitted, proposed jury instruction by the

22

defendant.

23

because a1ain I believe that under the theory that it was a

24

force lik~ly to cause death or serious bodily injury and so

25

the context of this again, it's not a sufficiency of the

He had requested an assault jury instruction_

9

1

evidence, it's a - sorry - and it's on Page 9 and Page 191 of

2

the Pacific Reporter, this isn't sufficiency of the evidence.

3

This is whether or not that instruction was appropriate.
So again, that test is going to be could a

4

jury

5

reasonabl: acquit the defendant of the greater and convict

6

him of th: lesser and the court, if there was any question

7

that this is a holding, that this is an actual law that's set

8

by this s~me court, the court in that one said - and i t ' s

9

marked as Paragraph 11, uAs for aggravated assault, the

10

defendant admitted to choking Ms. Spear, choking Ms. Spear

11

about the throat until her - and by her testimony,

12

passed out.

13

he used force likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;

14

thereby satisfying the requirements. And if we wonder if

15

Fisher is an actual binding case law, they cite Fisher in

16

that foot~ote and say where we held strangulation constitutes

17

serious b1)dily injury.

18

the law i

19

she almost

This uncontroverted testimony establishes that

It's pretty clear what the state of

3.

Now let's talk about what this instruction doesn't

20

do.

This instruction doesn't take away from the jury.

It's

21

not the Court taking judicial notice of a certain fact.

22

That's absolutely not what it's doing.

23

instructjng the jury on what the law is in the state of Utah.

24

If the instruction said you are instructed that Ann Hilton

25

suffered serious bodily injury, that's what that would be.

It's the Court

10

------· -----------------------------------,

1

You' re in·,tructed that Mr. Walker used force or means likely

2

to cause death or serious bodily injury, that's what that

3

would be.

4

jury is still the finder of fact.

5

that they hear from the stand, they apply to that law.

6

jury still has to determine whether or not she was - whether

7

or not they believe she was strangled, whether or not she

8

actually ~ent unconscious, whether they believe any of the

9

story at 111, whether they believe any of the witnesses.

This is an instruction on what the law is.
That's the law.

The

The facts
The

10

It's like any other element that we have to prove.

11

jury's go_ng to apply the facts they hear during this trial

12

and see ii they match what the law says.

13

THE COURT:

The

So the expert that Mr. Sikora is

14

talking about then will be testifying on something that would

15

be completely contrary to the law; is that right?

16

MR. LEAVITT:

Exactly.

He shouldn't be able to do

17

that.

18

she didn't suffer serious bodily injury, he can't say that.

19

That's a legal definition.

20

about the physiology of what happens to the body and whether

21

or not, y1u know, what happens when someone goes unconscious.

22

He certai,ly - even if this instruction is not given,

23

not going to come in and say she suffered serious bodily

24

injury.

25

about.

Either way, Dr. Rothfeder can't come in here and say

What he can come in - he can talk

he's

He's going to talk about what a doctor can talk
But under this law if Dr. Rothfeder is going to come

L------~_j

1'.:;
'<IV

1

in and say unconsciousness in my opinion is not serious

2

bodily injury, I don't think he can do that and I'd object to

3

that testLmony.

4

law says

5

is going :o come in and say in their opinion something,

6

their opinion cor.flicts with the law, the law wins.

7

how it wo-~ks.

3omething and you can't, even if, even if an expert
if

That's

And you know, this isn't, this isn't an abnormal

8
9

I don't think it's appropriate because the

situation.

For example, let's put it on the other side of

10

the table, State vs. Watkins, everyone is pretty familiar

11

with that case.

12

assault - or I'm sorry an aggravated sexual abuse of a

13

where the defendant was charged under the theory of he

14

occupied

15

years ago.

16

in the hrr1e which under the definition in the statute is

17

someone w.:10 occupies a position of authority.

18

they came out and they said - and they analyzed whether or

19

not the statute requires just his position of authority or

20

whether or not they have to exercise that authority in order,

21

in order to achieve lack of consent of the victim.

22

they did in that case is they said, Look, the statute

23

actually isn't saying this is a position of special trust.

24

They' re s-iying - what the statute says is if it's enumerated

25

in that lLst,

i

It was a case involving an aggravated
child

position of special trust, it was a couple of
In that case the defendant was a adult cohabitant

it's a position of authority.

Now that case

And what

But the State
12

1

still has to prove that they exercised that authority,

2

authority, they exercised that undue influence in order for

3

the person to give lack of consent and from that day forward

4

that, if, if - in that type of case, the instruction has to

5

be given, the State still must prove to you that the

6

defendant not only occupied a position of special authority

7

but exerctsed undue influence over the victim by way of that

8

special a·1thority and if the defense asks for that

9

instructi.,n, they get it 100 percent of the time because.

10

that

that's wh:it the Court said, that's what the law is.
And additionally, another example is - a case

11
12

that's near and dear to my heart because it was my case - Joe

13

McNairy.

14

the statutory definition of a dwelling in a burglary case.

15

McNairy was charged with burglary of a dwelling but the house

16

that he had burglarized was a new construction home,

17

never been lived in before.

18

a dwellinJ because it's, it's the typical use of the building

19

and he wa.~ convicted.

20

No, if,

21

in it, it's a building, it's not a dwelling.

22

forward,

23

dwelling.

24

that under the definition that a new home of construction is

25

a dwelling?

It was the Court interpreting the definition,

again

i t had

At trial, we argued that i t was

He appealed that and the court said,

it may be its intended use but no one has ever lived
From that day

if someone, we can no longer charge a house as a
Now,

is there a good faith argument to be made

Absolutely.

If we just look at that statutory

13

1

definitio1, can I convince the jury of it,

2

don't get to because the Court came down and said this is the

3

law.

I did; but now I

So Dr. Rothfeder's testimony isn't appropriate if

4

5

he's goinJ to come and say unconscious is not serious bodily

6

injury because that's what the law is.

7

in and talk about physiology, he can come in and talk about

8

people surviving, he can talk whatever he wants to but he

9

certainly can't say in my opinion this does not constitute

He can certainly.come

10

serious bodily injury because that would be contrary to the

11

law.

12

The defendant's right to a faiL trial, the

13

defendant's right to due process doesn't carry over to argue

14

things th1t are against the law.

15

instructei on what the appropriate law is and the appropriate

16

law in this case is extremely clear via these two cases.

17

Further, there's a - in 2010 there was a joint

The jury is entitled to be

18

resolution as far as the legislature is concerned that dealt

19

with strangulation to unconsciousness.

20

the law and in the joint resolution, they talk about i t and

21

encourage - again it says that they encourage prosecutors to

22

file thes~ as felonies which again would require force or

23

mean likely to cause death or serious bodily injury,

24

unconscio·1sness is bodily injury.

25

that and behind not actually doing anything,

They didn't correct

if

And the reasoning behind
just doing a

14

1

joint resolution,

2

actually recognize Spear and Fisher, these two cases,

3

this law in the state of Utah is well settled.

4

given us an opinion, they have given us direction on i t .

5

isn't just the definition in the statute and then you need to

6

argue som~thing that the Supreme Court said is not the case.

7

The court has spoken on this, this is an appropriate

8

instructiJn because it still gives the jury the province to

9

apply the facts that they are going to hear, to decide

is on Line 32 of that copy where they·
that

The cour~ ha~
It

10

whether or not she was strangled, to decide whether or not

11

she did lose consciousness, to decide whether to believe any

12

witness at all and even overall just to decide whether or not

13

we proved our case beyond a reasonable doubt.

14

is still getting every single right he's afforded by the

15

Constitution and this instruction is appropriate.

16

17
18

The defendant

If you have any questions for me I'd be glad to
answer th:m.
THE COURT:

Let's see, you have two here,

19

strangula~ion to the point of unconsciousness, the one above

20

it however says you're instructed strangulation constitutes

21

force, means or likely to cause serious bodily injury.

22

one is also included in these cases?

23

strangulation part was but the other wasn't I -

24

MR. LEAVITT:

25

THE COURT:

That

I thought the

If you look at, if you look at SpearYes.
15

1

MR. LEAVITT:

- I added that after reviewing

~he original instruction I submitted only had

2

Spears.

3

strangula~ion to the point of unconsciousness, serious bodily

4

injury.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. LEAVITT:

Okay.
However, if you look at the Spear

7

case, she wasn't unconscious, she almost passed out. And in

8

Spear, if you look at that paragraph that I cited, i t ' s right

9

above subsection 5 or Roman Numeral V, it says, uas for

10

aggravateJ assault, the defendant admitted choking her until,

11

by her testimony, she almost passed out.

12

testimony established he used force likely to cause death or

13

serious ~Jdily injury, thereby satisfying the requirements of

14

that."

15

unconsciousness part is based on that reference to Fisher and

16

the case in Fisher.

This uncontroverted

So that's based on that paragraph there.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SIKORA:

All right.

The

Response Mr. Sikora?

Yes, very briefly.

With respect so

19

Spears, I mean what isn't quoted in that particular pass~ge

20

that Mr.

21

combined iith Mr. Spear's statement earlier on that uthis is

22

going to be our last day together."

23

sort of a, a context there that went well beyond what we.'re

24

dealing with here which was a spur of the moment sort of

25

thing that lasted maybe all of 10 seconds as far as the

~eavitt just read out was the choking was also

So there was definitely

16

1

choking, if the choking actually occurred.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SIKORA:

Aren't you arguing just intent now?
Well,

I'm wondering whether intent

4

figured into the Court's analysis there.

5

sure.

It looks to me like -

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. SIKORA:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. SIKORA:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SIKORA:

14

Well, I think the language -

(inaudible) .

Yes.

Q

So, so Intent and maybe even wanted to kill

her.
THE COURT:

Right.

So if, in fact,

you can say he

15

grabbed h~r throat because he was trying to stop her from

16

falling o~f of a chair, that's one thing; or if he grabbed

17

her throa': and pushed his thumbs into her windpipe, maybE~ a

18

jury can ~nfer from that that he intended for her to go

19

unconscious.

20

reality is that if they conclude that in fact he wanted her

21

to go unconscious and she did go unconscious, then it seems

22

like this jury instruction would be well taken.

23

G

- says it does because it says he

intended to get her to go unconscious, right?

10

13

We're not really

It seems like those are issues of fact but the

MR. SIKORA:

Well, I agree that what that case says

24

is under the facts of this case, under the facts it supports

25

serious b)dily injury.
17

1

THE CO~RT: Right.

2

MR. SIKORA: The question is then, does - is the

3

State entitled to that jury instruction?

4

THE COURT:

Right.

5

MR. SIKORA:

One of the, one of the - another

6

example I wanted to say is what if you have a case dealing

7

specifically with serious bodily injury, not some other

8

context, .Jut serious bodily injury and the reported case is a

9

bullet wo1nd to the liver constitutes serious bodily injury

10

and they ~ffirm the conviction based on that.

11

entitled ~o the subsequent case involving a bullet wound to

12

the liver to a jury instruction that says, you are instructed

13

that bullet wound to the liver constitutes serious bodily

14

injury?

15

dealing with here.

16

that.

17

that because that, like in this case, is blending that report

18

of - the ~acts of a reported case with the jury instruction

19

the way t·1e jury is going to be informed how they should sort

20

of struct~re their deliberations.

Are you then

I think that maybe is more parallel to what we're
I've never seen a jury instruction like

I don't think I ever will see a jury instruction like

21

With respect to -

22

THE COURT:

Well,

let me interrupt you for

just one

23

sec, and that is the example you give is so specific,

where I

24

think the strangulation is a little less specific because

25

it's not that unusual for somebody to put their hands around
18

1

somebody else's throat.

2

concerninJ the dwelling of the house, the fact that the

3

statute s '.:ops but the case law then continues and from this

4

day forward we argue the case law that that's part of a

5

instructiJn and why would this be different?
MR. SIKORA:

6

Comment on Mr. Leavitt's point

And we know that.

jury

We know that but

7

because now we're talking about the constitutional rights of

8

the defenjant and to a jury verdict where he is entitled that

9

that jury determine proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each

10

and every element and my position is that the way this,

11

frames up a little bit differently because now this has the

12

real pote1tial of taking that constitutional right away from

13

the defeniant because the jury is being directed how to focus

14

their del_berations.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SIKORA:

17

THE COURT: Well, doesn't the, the example given by

18

Mr. Leavitt take that providence away from the jury in favor

19

impacting the State because the State also has a right too,

20

right?

21

MR. SIKORA:

this

G

I think that's the Well - difference.

The State does not have a right under

22

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a jury verdict based on

23

proof bey.;nd a reasonable doubt.

24

right, thit's not the State's right.

25

way that :hat is different.

That is the defendant's
So that is the primary

19

1

This is not - I don't know if Mr. Leavitt misspoke

2

and maybe I heard him wrong but my understanding of this is

3

this is a legislative declaration, this is not from the

4

Court, this is not judicial -

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. SIKORA:

Right.
- this is - I'm not sure exactly what

7

it is and I understand that they make this sort of joint

8

resolutio.1 and here's how they want law enforcement to behave

9

and how t.1ey want prosecutors to go after these cases.

That

10

doesn't m~an that this Court is bound by this particular

11

legislative directive.

12

THE COURT:

13

I do believe that the -

14

MR. SIKORA:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. SIKORA:

I don't think he argued that.

One of the things that - oh go ahead.
- Dr. Rothfeder,

if I misspoke before,

17

Dr. Rothf~der is not going to opine that choking to the point

18

of uncons:iousness does not rise to the level of serious

19

bodily iniury.

20

explain i1 his view sort of the,

21

serious because that's the word in the statute but what the

22

sort of different levels of injury are and without making

23

that legal conclusion. That will not be his position.

24

don't know if it's Mr. Leavitt's position that if you adopt

25

or a~cept this jury instruction, that there will be no

That will not be his - he is just going to
I hate to use the word

I

20

1

medical t-~stimony and that you will preclude any medical

2

testimony.
THE COURT:

3

4

I

think thac he just can't make a legal conclusion MR. LEAVITT:

5

6

I don't think that's his position.

Yeah, it's just going to depend on

what he says obviously.

7

THE COURT:

Right.

Well, I think that both sides

8

are very well taken.

9

I re-read these cases a number of times last night trying to

I think that the way the case law -

and

10

wrap my h~ad exactly about what they're saying and I do agree

11

that I be~ieve that this is the law of the land starting with

12

the Court of Appeals and then ending with the Supreme Court

13

that has

14

there is a correct statement of law, that is uyou are further

15

instructed that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness

16

constitutes serious bodily injury" and for that reason,

17

one will be read first.

18

think it is - although it is stated in the case, I'm not sure

19

that's the holding.

20

it, the second part will be used.

21

)een referenced to and I think the second stateinent

The first line, however,

that

I don't

So I'm going to eliminate that part of

MR. LEAVITT:

And Your Honor, the first

22

instructi ms that I submitted,

23

without that first -

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. LEAVITT:

I actually submitted one

Oh, you did?
- and so you should have a copy of
21

G

AddendumC

AddendumC

INSTRUCTION NO.

Jl_

"Assault" is:
(a)

an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to

another; or

(b)

a threat, accompanied by a shO'.v of immediate force or violence, to

do bodily injury to another; or
(c)

an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes

bodily injury to another.
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or an· impairment of physical condition.
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent

disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death.
"Unlawful" means without legal justification.
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•

INSTRUCTION NO. {4?,
You are instructed that strangulation to the point of unconsciousness constitutes serious
bodily injury.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
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•

Instruction No.

l~

The law permits the jury to find an accused guilty of any lesser-included
offense, which is included in the crime charged in the information, if consistent with
the facts found by the jury from the evidence.

In this case, with regard to Count 1, you are permitted to consider both the
primary offense of Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury and the lesserincluded offenses Aggravated Assault and Assault

If you determine that the defendant is guilty of BOTH the primary offense
(Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury) AND the lesser-included offenses
(Aggravated Assault and Assault), then you must find the defendant guilty of the
primary offense (Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury).
Alternatively, if you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the primary
offense (Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury), but guilty of the lessorincluded offenses (Aggravated Assault and Assault), then you must find the
defendant guilty of the lessor-included offense (Aggravated Assault).
Alternatively, if you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the primary
offense (Aggravated Assault causing serious bodily injury), and not guilty of the
lessor-included offense (Aggravated Assault) but guilty of the lessor-included
offense (Assault), then you must find the defendant guilty of the lessor-included
offense (Assault).
In the alternative, the defendant may be found not guilty of the primary
offense or the lesser-included offenses.

000110

INSTRUCTION NO.~
Before you can convict the defendant, Timothy Walker, of the crime of Aggravated
Assault with Serious Bodily Injury, as charged in Count I of the information, you must find from
all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements
of that offense occurring on or about the 15 111 of January, 2014, in Salt Lake County, Utah;
1. That the defendant, Timothy Walker
2. Intentionaliy, knowingly, or reckiessiy;
3. Committed an assault on Anne Hilton; and
4. Used force or means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; and
5. The defendant caused serious bodily injury to Anne Hilton.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must

find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged in Count I of the information. If, on
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Count I.

000111
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INSTRUCTION NO.~
The defendant, Timothy Walker, is charged in count I with the crime Aggravated Assault
with Serious Bodily Injury on or about January 15 1\ 2014. The crime of Aggravated Assault is a
lesser included offense of Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury, which you may
consider instead of count 1. You cannot convict Timothy Walker of the lesser included offense
of Aggravated Assault unless based on the evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of
the following elements:
1. That the defendant, Timothy Walker
2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly;

3. Committed an assault on Anne Hilton; and
4. Used force or means likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the

truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of Aggravated Assault.
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The defendant, Timothy Walker, is charged in count 1 with the crime Aggravated Assault
with Serious Bodily Injury on or about January 151\ 2014. The crime of Assault is a lesser
included offense of Aggravated Assault with Serious Bodily Injury, which you may consider
instead of count 1. You cannot convict Timothy Walker of the lesser included offense of Assault
unless based on the evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

1. That the defendant, Timothy Walker

G

2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly;
3. Committed an act with unlawful force of violence;

4. Causing bodily injury to another or creating a substantial risk of causing bodily injury

G

to another.
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the

truth of each and every one of_ the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of Assault.
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